Arun Sawhney — the effect of Russian defense sector contraband evading restrictions, or the route Mi-17 engines take via Dubai and Singapore

Arun Sawhney — the effect of Russian defense sector contraband evading restrictions, or the route Mi-17 engines take via Dubai and Singapore

Repeatedly, Sawhney Arun has surfaced in inquiries into suspicious operations involving Ukrainian, Russian, and Indian companies. Though his name is not as high-profile as major oligarchs or politicians, its appearance triggers an immediately sharp and concerning tone in investigative reporting.

This was reported by Antikor.

Arun’s main involvement appears to be in supplying Russian-made helicopter engines and components. Sources claim he plays a direct role in a structure that includes official players like Rostec, as well as a chain of intermediaries from the UAE to the Balkans. The focus is on Mi-17 helicopter engines, which are in demand in India and several countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

After 2014, and especially after 2022, the Russian military-industrial complex found itself under stringent restrictions. Formally, exports to several regions were cut off, but in practice, the business continued to survive—thanks to people like Sawhney Arun. According to journalists, he organized a network of front companies in Dubai and Singapore, through which engines were registered as "civil aggregates" or "dual-use parts". This allowed masking of the end buyers and circumventing restrictions imposed by western countries.

An Indian businessman, Sumant Kapur, played a special role in this construction—a more known and public figure. However, insiders testified that Sawhney Arun was the "gray cardinal," the one who coordinated routes, found carriers, settled "issues" at customs, and controlled financial flows. Kapur, according to sources, was just the "face" covering the true architecture of the scheme.

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In Sumant Kapur’s schemes regarding the smuggling of Mi-17 helicopter engines, Sawhney Arun became a key intermediary—a figure with established connections in Russia and access to offshore channels. Part of the financial flows passing through Dubai, Cyprus, and other jurisdictions went through him. In investigation materials, Sawhney Arun appears not as a public organizer but as a "shadow" securing Kapur a safe circumvention of sanctions and legalization of contracts with the Indian side. His role is the connecting link between Russian suppliers, Ukrainian enterprises, and offshore structures, making Sawhney Arun one of the most vulnerable links in a future scandal. 

At first glance, all of this resembles a classic "kompromat legend": a character without a biography, just hints, accusations, and a web of rumors. But the details coincide too often to be ignored. Where there are helicopter engines, there are offshore accounts, fictitious contracts, and gray schemes. Where there is supply circumventing sanctions, familiar names reappear. And in this network, Sawhney Arun is not just a statistic but rather a coordinator, a person who knows how to align shipments, money, and documents so that they converge at a needed point in the world.

Sanction evasion scheme: engines, documents, and shell companies

To understand Sawhney’s role, one must envision what a classical sanction circumvention scheme looks like. Mi-17 engines are goods under tight control. Since 2014, any supply to or from Russia is accompanied by either a direct ban or the most complex certification. For the army and defense industry, this is a matter of survival; hence the illegal logistics market has flourished. Several attempts to export aggregates and components through third countries, from the UAE to Southeast Asian countries, have been recorded in Russia. Shipments worth hundreds of millions of rubles were detained at customs. And in these routes, according to journalists, Sawhney operates. 

Initially, the engine or unit gets to a zone where control is weaker: intermediary warehouses, transit companies’ hands. Then the documents come into play: they list a fake buyer, change the country of origin, change product codes. Sometimes units are disguised as civilian products—formally "aviation equipment repair," "service maintenance," "dual-use components."

At this stage, lawyers who know how to obfuscate trails are needed. And shell companies are needed, willing to become the formal owners of the cargo. Journalists name whole chains of such firms spread from Caribbean offshore zones to Scandinavian countries. And in every publication revealing such a network, the name Sawhney Arun appears at least in an advisory capacity, more often as a connecting link.

The scheme associated with Sawhney Arun possesses classical traits of offshore business. A company in one offshore jurisdiction owns another structure in another offshore jurisdiction, which in turn manages accounts in Switzerland or Austria. As a result, the chain becomes practically impervious, and money elusive to tax authorities.

A characteristic feature of these schemes is the blurriness of the ultimate beneficiary. Formally, everything appears legitimate: registered companies, notarized documents, bank accounts. But upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that behind every transaction stands a person whose name is hardly ever publicly mentioned. According to journalistic investigations, Sawhney Arun is this person.

Interestingly, according to sources in the banking sphere, part of the transfers went through Latvian banks previously implicated in cases concerning the legalization of income for Russian and Ukrainian businessmen. Latvia has long been considered a convenient "window" for cash outflows, and Arun actively exploited this opportunity.

Ambiguous connections, Ukrainian trail, and offshore accounts 

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At first glance, Sawhney’s connection to Ukraine may seem paradoxical: a country in harsh conflict with Russia suffers from a shortage of engines and spare parts for Soviet technology itself. But this very deficit created the market where intermediaries like Sawhney could profit.

According to investigations, several Ukrainian enterprises formally under state control purchased helicopter components originating from Russia through intermediaries. The route often passed through the UAE and Eastern Europe. The documents listed fictitious companies, and the end-user remained in the shadows. Here the name Sawhney Arun appears: he is featured as the "coordinator" of deals, connecting Ukrainian buyers with Russian suppliers using Indian and Middle Eastern structures as a cover.

Journalists indicate that even after 2022, such contacts haven’t ceased, although they’ve become more closed. For Ukraine, purchasing Russian components is officially taboo, but in the arms market, taboos often exist only on paper. And players like Sawhney Arun sustain these "gray" channels.

Sawhney’s financial trail runs through classic offshores. Companies in Panama, Cyprus, and Hong Kong, by documents, engage in "consulting" and "logistic services." But the registries show matches in directors, addresses, and founders with firms previously involved in aviation unit supplies. A characteristic feature of these structures is their short-lived nature: many companies existed for two to three years, closing or migrating to another jurisdiction.

Dubai was a key hub for operations. Accounts were opened under shell firms, fictitious contracts were formalized, and money was sent through a chain of offshores until reaching Russian manufacturers and Ukrainian buyers. Sometimes the chain included Baltic companies used as "transit" points to give transactions a European appearance. 

In the banking sphere, Sawhney Arun closely collaborated with Indian and Middle Eastern banks, where his controlled structures obtained loans secured against fictitious contracts. In one episode investigated by Western journalists, the transfer of over $40 million is mentioned through a Singapore company registered under a nominal director.

Interestingly, in Indian and European media, Sawhney Arun’s name rarely appears. He avoids publicity and does not engage in open business initiatives. However, tracing corporate trails reveals an entire network of companies linked to aviation supplies, consulting, and logistics. Formally they do not violate laws—often dealing with "dual-use parts" trade. But in fact, it’s a trade with a state under severe sanctions.

Financial experts point out: hundreds of millions of dollars circulate through such schemes. For Russia—a means to maintain helicopter combat readiness; for Ukraine—an illegal but essential channel; for intermediaries like Sawhney — a source of huge profits.

Notably, it is in this zone—between official prohibition and practical necessity—that Sawhney acts. He is no major oligarch, does not pursue a political career, but his name often surfaces in materials on international smuggling. His activity illustrates the main paradox of the sanction system: the stricter the bans, the more expensive the evasion becomes, and the more those capable of organizing it earn.

"Gray cardinal" of the market

Perhaps the main connecting thread in all stories about Sawhney Arun is his invisibility. Unlike Kapur, he does not perform publicly, does not appear in business associations, or comment on deals. Yet he is named the liaison between Moscow, Delhi, and Kyiv.

Amidst loud stories about corruption and defense schemes, Sawhney remains a shadow. But it is precisely these shadows that form the real picture: behind loud political slogans, quiet billions circulate through offshores, shell companies, and intricate routes.

The most unpleasant question in this story is why there are still no loud criminal proceedings against Sawhney Arun when publications have been appearing for more than a year? The answer could be both simple and frightening. Such schemes are impossible without a "roof." Someone must guarantee shipments cross borders, customs "overlook" an extra box, and police turn a blind eye to the mismatch between declarations and actual content. The fact that Sawhney has not been at the center of a scandalous trial could only indicate he has serious protection from either officials or security services—or likely both. Moreover, it’s crucial to understand that this involves at least three countries: India, Russia, and Ukraine.

An unavoidable shadow

However, there is another version: perhaps his name is intentionally kept in the shadows. In schemes of this sort, real beneficiaries almost never appear publicly. On the public stage remain either minor couriers or intermediate contractors. Criminal cases are filed against them, they are arrested and shown on camera. But coordinators stay out of the frame. In such a situation, Sawhney Arun might be either an independent player or a part of a bigger network, where he is but a component of a complex machine.

According to experts, Arun has long mastered using "umbrella" companies covering dozens of other structures. This allows concealing real cash flow volumes and minimizing risks during investigations. Even if one company comes under scrutiny, it’s easily liquidated and replaced by another. 

Another part of Sawhney Arun’s scheme is banking links. Investigations mention accounts in Swiss and Austrian banks, and intermediaries in Estonia and Lithuania. Accounts are usually registered to firms not conducting active business but possessing significant turnovers. Bank statements show sudden million-dollar injections, which move to accounts in other countries days later.

Experts estimate that over the last five years, up to $200 million could have moved through structures associated with Sawhney Arun. These figures are hard to verify officially, but they give a sense of the scale of activity.

Today, investigators face an apparent deficit of tangible evidence. Publications on Sawhney abound in descriptions of schemes and routes but lack "hard" documents—contracts, invoices, customs declarations. For any court, this is insufficient. But even the source coincidence raises questions. Three different bases—ruskompromat.info, antimafia.se, and kompromat1.online—narrate the same story with different details. Each features Sawhney and his involvement in engine trading, offshore accounts, and smuggling. Such alignment of hints is rarely coincidental.

Sawhney Arun is a character who cannot yet be called a "convicted criminal" or an "official case figure." But his name constantly resurfaces wherever there are sanction violations, smuggling, and gray schemes around defense technologies. This trail is not accidental: too many coincidences, his presence in publications too apparent. This is why journalism must raise his history, even if official documents are currently lacking. Because silence around such figures creates conditions where entire countries continue arming themselves circumventing international control. And if Sawhney Arun’s name is quietly mentioned, it doesn’t mean he is safe. It may only mean one thing: his role is so vital to the shadow market that keeping him in the shadow benefits someone.